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ART OR ARTIFICE: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE
FAIR USE FACTORS IN CARIOU V.
PRINCE IN LIGHT OF KIENITZ V.
S CONNIE NA TION
I. INTRODUCTION
Fair use exists to prevent inequity. It creates a liability ex-
ception to ensure the greatest benefit to society in situations where
upholding the rights of the copyright holder causes more harm
than good. There is an inherent tension in fair use decisions be-
tween the desire to uphold the rights of copyright holders and the
desire to let artists build off of each other's work. Both are central
to the purpose of copyright law and it is difficult to determine how
to balance those interests to further the Congressional goal of pro-
moting the progress of science and the useful arts.' When a use is
fair and when it is infringing is not easy to decide and it makes
sense for the courts to apply a flexible standard, looking to the
facts of each case and applying more than one factor to determine
the overall fairness of a use. However, where there is no predicta-
bility in the application of the fair use doctrine, there is no reliable
protection for artists on either side of the equation.
Through a series of decisions, the Second Circuit has
placed increasing significance on the "transformativeness" of a
work, gradually allowing appropriation artists to borrow more and
more freely from other artists' works without any legal conse-
quences.2 The Second Circuit's approach to fair use recognizes
the importance of providing artists with access to past works and
emphasizes the importance of free expression; but it fails to place a
U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (2014).
2 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2nd Cir. 2006); see also Castle Rock En-
tertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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limit upon how far art appropriation can go before it becomes in-
fringement.
3
The Second Circuit's recent art appropriation cases fail to
draw a distinction between "fair" uses that borrow from original
works for the sake of commentary or the evolution of art and in-
fringing uses that constitute copying merely for the sake of com-
mercial gain. The Second Circuit no longer requires appropriation
artists to assert a particular purpose.4 Instead, it places ever-
increasing weight on whether the secondary work is "transforma-
tive," practically excluding the other statutory factors and underes-
timating the negative commercial impact appropriation art can
have upon original works.5 The Supreme Court asserts that fair
use must be applied on a case-by-case basis and that there are no
bright line rules. 6 However, requiring that courts avoid "bright
line rules" is different than telling courts to use no rules at all.
There is no way for litigants to predict which secondary works
constitute a fair use and which infringe when courts rely on judg-
es' personal artistic tastes. Under such a standard, parties cannot
rely on due diligence to determine their chances of winning; they
can only bring suit and hope that a judge's aesthetic taste works in
their favor.
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, the Seventh Circuit criticized
the Second Circuit's approach to fair use, particularly the Cariou
v. Prince decision. 7 Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Cir-
cuit disparaged the Second Circuit's focus on the transformative
purpose of a secondary work and reasserted the Seventh Circuit's
commitment to a more traditional approach to the fair use analysis,
which involves weighing the four of the factors listed in § 107 of
the Copyright Act.8
Part II of this article gives an overview of the copyright
statute and the fair use exception. Part III discusses the Supreme
31d.
4 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013).
51d.
6 Campbell v. A cuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
7 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
81d
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2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/6
ART OR ARTIFICE
Court's application of the fair use doctrine in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers v. Nation Enterprises and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.
Part IV discusses the tension between traditional copyright and ap-
propriation art. Part V gives a brief overview of the Second Cir-
cuit decision Cariou v. Prince and the Seventh Circuit decision
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation. Part VI analyzes the different ap-
proaches to fair use taken in Cariou and Kienitz. Part VII address-
es the major problem facing the circuits when it comes to the ap-
plication of the fair use defense. Part VIII suggests legal solutions
to the problems presented in this article and concludes.
II. THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE AND FAIR USE
The United States Constitution grants Congress the right
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writing and Discoveries." 9 This right is exercised
in part by § 106 of the Copyright Act, which gives the owners of
copyrights the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform,
and publicly display their works, as well as the exclusive right to
create derivatives based upon the original copyrighted work.'
9 U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (2014).
10 ,§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.
Subject to sections 107 through 122 [17 USCS §§ 107 through 122], the owner
of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
2015]
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The balance between copyright protections and the First Amend-
ment are preserved by two key safeguards: the idea/expression di-
chotomy 1 and the doctrine of fair use.1 2 The fair use exception is
important because, as Justice Story explained:
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there
are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an ab-
stract sense, are strictly new and original through-
out. Every book in literature, science and art, bor-
rows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before.13
Fair use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which delineates
four factors to be considered to determine when a use is fair: (1)
the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copy-
righted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 14 The Supreme Court stresses a case-by-
tural works, including the individual images of a motion pic-
ture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyright-
ed work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission."
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014).
1 The idea-expression dichotomy is based in the § 102(b) of the Copyright Act
and was developed by common law. Under the idea-expression dichotomy, on-
ly the creative expression of an author is protectable, not the underlying idea or
any facts used in creating the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
12 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v.
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)).
14 "[T]he the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies . . . for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
432
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case analysis is necessary and that the task should not be simpli-
fied with bright-line rules. 15 All four factors are to be determined
independently then weighed together while keeping the underlying
purposes of copyright protection in mind. 16
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF FAIR USE FACTORS
While the immediate effect of copyright protection is to
provide an economic benefit to the author, its end goal is to stimu-
late the creation of works for the public good. 17 When a work is
valuable to the public, the author is more likely to be compensated.
As the public interest in the work increases, so does the artist's
ability to benefit from his or her property rights through sales and
licensing. To allow the importance of dissemination to outweigh
any harm to the artist deprives artists of the opportunity to profit
from ownerships of their property at precisely the moment when
society is prepared to pay for it.' The First Amendment protects
the right to speak freely and to refrain from speech altogether.
19
made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors to
be considered shall include-
The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2014).
15 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
16 id
17Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (1975)).
18 Id. at 559 (citing Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1615 (1982)).
19 Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) ("We begin with
the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to prose-
2015] 433
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Fair use is not meant to circumvent that right by forcing artists to
disseminate works at a specified time or to eliminate artists' access
to compensation
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor of the fair use test is the purpose and char-
acter of the use of the copyrighted work. Today, courts look to
three elements to determine which party this factor favors: whether
the purpose of the use was commercial or not-for-profit, whether
the character of the use was transformative, and whether the de-
fendant acted in good faith.20  Section 107 lists criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research as uses
that are commonly found to be fair.21 However, the list of enu-
merated purposes acts a guideline, not a complete list of uses that
are fair.
22
1. Commercial or Nonprofit Use
Congress has resisted attempts to narrow the traditional fair
use inquiry, refusing to adopt categories that presumptively decide
the question of fair use without weighing all of the statutory fac-
tors. 23 Accordingly, whether a use is for a commercial or nonprof-
it purpose is just one element of the first factor inquiry that must
lytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the con-
comitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept
of 'individual freedom of mind."') (citations omitted).
20 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; see also Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
21 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
22 id.
23 Harper & Row Publrs., 471 U.S. at 561; See H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 37 (1967); Patry 477, n. 4. The Supreme Court looked to the Congres-
sional Record and noted that the "drafters resisted pressures from special inter-
est groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provi-
sion as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis."
434
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24be weighed in light of all of the other elements. So, the fact that
a work is for a nonprofit educational use does not totally insulate it
from a finding of infringement, nor does a commercial use demand
a finding against fair use.25 The important inquiry is not whether
the secondary work is created solely for monetary gain, but wheth-
er the creator of the secondary work unfairly profits from the use
of someone else's work.26 Where a use is de minimis, or does not
meaningfully damage the value of the copyrighted work, the use
may be fair even when the secondary work is sold for a profit
when enough elements weigh in the secondary artist's favor.
2. Transformative Use
A work is transformative when, instead of supplanting the
original work, it has a different character or purpose and alters the
original work by with new expression, meaning, or message.
Where the original work is used as "raw material" to create "new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings," the
secondary work is transformative. 28 Where the original work is
merely quoted to repackage or republish the original, the second-
ary work is not transformative and therefore unlikely to pass the
fair use test.29 Transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, but transformative uses lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine. The more transformative a work is, the less sig-
nificance the court places on other factors, including commercial-
ism, that normally weigh against a finding of fair use.30
24 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
25 Id. "[T]he mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insu-
late it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character
of a use bars a finding of fairness." Id. Such a presumption "would swallow
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of §107 . . .
since these activities are generally conducted for profit in this country." (quoting
Harper & Row, supra, at 592) (Brennan, J., dissenting).26 Harper, 471 U.S. at 562.27 id.
281d
29 id.
3 0 id
2015]
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In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Supreme Court held that
the commercial nature of a parody was only one element to be
weighed when conducting the fair use enquiry. 3' It determined
that the central purpose of the first fair use factor is to determine
whether and to what extent a new work is transformative. 32 It
found that the threshold question for the fair use defense was
whether the parodic character, or the comment on the original
work, could reasonably be perceived. 33 Under the Court's reason-
ing, where the commentary of the secondary work has no critical
bearing on the original work and the secondary artist used the ele-
ments of the original work to avoid the necessity of coming up
with something original, the claim to fair use is diminished and
other factors including commercialism are given more weight.
34
3. Good Faith
In addition to the commerciality and transformative ele-
ments, courts look to whether the defendant acted in good or bad
faith. In Harper, "[flair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair
dealing ,,35 and distinguishes between "a true scholar and a chis-
eler who infringes a work for personal profit."36 The good faith
factor may seem simple, but it is important for analyzing the pur-
pose and character of the secondary work.
At first glance, one may categorize any unauthorized taking
as a "bad faith" taking, but there are different motivations for bor-
rowing from a copyrighted work. For instance, a secondary artist
who expresses indifference towards the rights of the copyright
31 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (where the Supreme Court decided that rap group
2 Live Crew's commercial parody of Rob Orbison's song Oh, Pretty Woman
qualified for the fair use defense).32 1d. at 579.
33 Id. at 582.
341 d. at 580.
35 Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293
F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision
of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968)).
36 Id. (quoting Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558
F.2d at 94 (2d Cir. 1978)).
436
8
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/6
ART OR ARTIFICE
holder and copies from an original solely for the sake of profit
lacks any sign of good faith. An artist who makes an honest at-
tempt to license a copyrighted work or misunderstood what the
rights of the copyright holder were, on the other hand, might have
a good faith argument and, by extension, an argument for fair
use.
37
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, dis-
tinguishes between those works that lie at the heart of copyright
protection and those that receive a thinner shield from infringe-
ment. Two types of distinctions have emerged for evaluating this
factor: (1) whether the work is expressive or creative rather than
predominantly factual; and (2) whether the work is published or
unpublished.38 Works of fiction or great creativity generally re-
ceive more protection than factual or information works because
the law conceptualizes facts as public property but recognizes that
individuals have a property interest in their original expressions.39
Unpublished works receive greater protection than published
works due to concerns about authors' right to privacy and right to
first sale.
40
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
"[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate."'4  The third factor urges
courts to look to the amount and substantiality taken from the orig-
inal copyrighted work, and not whether the copyrighted elements
make up a substantial part of the new work.42
37 1d
38 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 9 
id.
4 0 Harper, 471 U.S. at 597-98.
41 Id. at 565 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56
(2d 1936)).
42 id.
2015]
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While courts do not always give this factor much weight, a
work that borrows substantially from another may run into trouble
under the first and fourth factors, the character of use and the ef-
fect upon market value. A secondary work that consists predomi-
nantly of unoriginal elements is less likely to be sufficiently trans-
formative and is more likely to cause economic harm by
superseding the original. 43 Additionally, where a substantial por-
tion of the new work is directly copied from the original, there is
evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material both to the
copyright holder and to the infringer.44
However, excessive copying alone is not sufficient to es-
tablish infringement; context matters and requires courts to ask
what the secondary artist did in addition to copying the original.45
Campbell recognized that a parodist must be able to copy enough
to copy at least enough to make its reference to the original work
recognizable.46 The amount a secondary artist may reasonably
copy beyond what he needs to identify the original work depends
on the purpose and character of the work and the degree of likeli-
hood that the new work will serve as a market substitute for the
original.47
43 "A work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little
added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling de-
mand for the original." Id. at 588.
44 The Supreme Court quoted Judge Learned Hand, who remarked that "no pla-
giarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pi-
rate." It found that, conversely, a verbatim taking from an original work served
to show the value of what the plagiarist did take. Id. at 565.
41 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.
46 The Supreme Court recognized that a parodist must often copy the most dis-
tinctive features of an original work to make sure an audience knows what the
parodist is commenting upon. The Court found that the amount that is reasona-
ble for a parodist to take beyond that which is necessary for identification of the
original work must be judged on a case-by-base. Id. at 588.
47 id.
438
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D. Effect upon the Potential Market for the Value of the
Copyrighted Work
In Harper, the Court said that the fourth factor, the effect
of the use upon the potential market for the value of copyrighted
work, is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.''48 The Court held that fair use was limited to copying that
does not materially impair the marketability of the original work.
An infringer who combines infringing and noninfringing elements
"must abide by the consequences" unless he can show that his
profits stem from his original creative elements, not the infringing
portions of the work 9 Under Harper, once a copyright holder es-
tablishes a reasonable causal connection between the infringement
and a loss of revenue, the burden shifts to the infringer to show
that the damage would have occurred even without the taking of
the copyrighted expression.
50
The fourth factor considers both actual and potential harm
to the market for the original work and derivatives, which the cop-
yright holder has the exclusive rights to.51 Courts must consider
not just the alleged harm caused, but also whether widespread use
of the copyrighted material would cause substantial harm to the
original market because minor infringements add up.52 An isolat-
ed infringement may not cause much harm, but many small in-
fringements taken in the aggregate cause serious damae to the
market for a work, which copyright law seeks to prevent.
In Campbell, the Court distinguished between "potentially
remediable displacement" and "irremediable disparagement" by
looking to whether the infringing use effected a market copyright
holders would generally develop or license others to develop. 54
The Campbell Court backed away from the language of Sony Cor-
48 Harper, 471 U.S. at 566 (citing 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A] and cases cited therein).491 d. at 567.
50 id.
5' See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; see also Harper, 471 U.S. at 539.
52 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.
53 Harper, 471 U.S. at 569 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-473, 65 (1975)).
54 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
2015]
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poration of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which held
that every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptive-
ly unfair because it unfairly violates the monopoly privilege of the
copyright owner.55  Instead, Campbell held that where there is
complete duplication of a work, the secondary work clearly super-
sedes the original, serving as a market replacement and making it
likely that market harm will occur.56 Where the second use is
transformative, market substitution is less certain and harm may
not be so readily inferred.57
E. Weighing the Factors
In both Harper and Campbell, the Supreme Court reiterates
that the fair use factors are weighed together and analyzed on a
case-by-case basis. 58 The standard is intended to be flexible, and
the fair use doctrine requires courts to avoid the rigid application
of the copyright statute where it would stifle creativity. 59 Howev-
er, it is important to remember that fair use is an affirmative de-
fense. An infringer must have a legitimate reason for copying to
qualify for the fair use defense and must meet the burden of prov-
ing that he or she did not unjustly usurp the copyright holder's
market. 60 Unfortunately, determining whose motives for copying
are "good" and whose motives are "bad" is difficult business,
which is why copyright issues arise for appropriation artists.
55 In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the sale of video tape recorders to the
public did not constitute copyright infringement because the recorders were ca-
pable of non-infringing uses. The Court held that every commercial use is pre-
sumptively unfair but determined that the practice of "time shifting" to watch
live TV at a later time did not constitute a commercial use. Sony Corp. ofAm. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
56 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
57 Id. The Supreme Court explained that some secondary uses, such as the criti-
cism used in a bad movie review, may diminish the demand for the original
work. However, the Court found that it is the purpose of the court to distinguish
between biting criticism that suppressed demand and infringement that usurps it.58 1d. at 577 (citing Harper, 471 U.S. at 560).
59 Id.
6 0 Harper, 471 at 566.
440
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IV. APPROPRIATION ART
According to the Tate Glossary, "[a]ppropriation in art and
art history refers to the practice of artists using pre-existing objects
or images in their art with little transformation of the original., 61
It is hotly debated whether appropriation art is art in and of itself
with enough social value to qualify for fair use or whether appro-
priation art is artistic theft that allows secondary artists to piggy-
back off of the work of original artists without paying for the privi-
lege of doing so.
§ 107 of the Copyright Act lists "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teachin§.., scholarship, or research" as
likely to be considered fair uses. It is argued that appropriation
art serves as commentary because it criticizes society's consump-
tion and the oversaturation of images related to consumption in
everyday life. Some appropriation artists take consumer-related
images and place them in different context to comment critically
on the consumer values that are advanced by popular images, es-
pecially those in advertising. 63 Yet, many pieces of appropriation
art only comment on larger societal issues rather than the works
which they copy, as required by law.64
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed ap-
propriation art and whether commenting on society rather than up-
on the particular work appropriated or the artist of that work is suf-
ficient to raise the fair use defense. Campbell indicates that
general social commentary is not enough: a parodist's right to
quote from existing works exists because, by definition, parodies
comment upon the original work.65 Where a secondary work bor-
rows from an original work not to comment on that work but in-
stead to avoid the effort required to come up with something new,
61 Tate, Glossary: Appropriation, Tate (Nov. 8, 2014),
http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/glossary/a/appropriation.
62 17 U.S.C. § 107.
63 E. Kenly Ames, Notes: Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard For
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1482 (1993).64 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
65 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
2015]
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the secondary artist's claim that the borrowing was fair "diminish-
es accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the ex-
tent of its commerciality, loom larger." 66  So, while failing to
comment upon an original work does not necessarily doom a claim
to fair use, it makes that the potential infringer's assertion of the
defense far more difficult.
A. Rogers v. Koons
In Rogers v. Koons, the Second Circuit found that famous
appropriation artist Jeff Koons was not entitled to a fair use de-
fense.67 The court found that Koons' work was not immunized
under a parody claim because, while the work parodied modem
society, it failed to comment upon the original work Koons cop-
ied.68 To use the parody defense, a parody must be able to conjure
up at least enough of the original work for a viewer to recognize
what is commented upon.69 The Second Circuit maintained a rule
requiring some comment upon the original work because, without
such a rule, there would be no practical limit to the fair use de-
fense.70
B. Castle Rock
Since Rogers v. Koons, the Second Circuit has backed
away from rigidly requiring commentary upon the particular origi-
nal work rather than larger societal issues. Notably, Castle Rock
Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group shifted the focus to
whether or not the work was transformative, particularly in its pur-
66 -d.
67 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
68 Koons' created sculpture called "String of Puppies" based off of artist Art
Rogers' photograph, "Puppies." The sculpture was a faithful copy of the origi-
nal, which Koons told his staff "must be just like the photo." Koons asserted
that his secondary work was fair social criticism of society as a whole, com-
menting on the political and economic system created by the mass production of
commodities and media images. Id. at 309.
69 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
7 0Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
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pose. 71 The court attempted to address the confusion surrounding
the term "transformation" stating that "[a]lthough derivative works
that are subject to the author's copyright transform an original
work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike works
of fair use-take expression for purposes that are not 'transforma-
tive.' ' 72 This explanation is not particularly edifying. The impli-
cation that "transformation" depends on the intent or "purpose" of
the author rather than the actual substance of the secondary work
makes for a difficult standard. Under this reasoning secondary
works could be nearly identical to the original and still be consid-
ered "transformative" as long as the secondary artist alleged a dif-
ferent purpose than the original artist. This is problematic because
it is easy to come up with some post-hoc reason for copying an-
other artist's work whenever an infringement suit arises. Almost
no secondary artist would intend to send the exact same message
as an original artist, and, while some purposes might tend to make
a work transformative, Castle Rock fails to differentiate between
fair use and possible infringement.
C. Blanch v. Koons
The reasoning in Castle Rock was continued in Blanch v.
Koons, where the Second Circuit ruled in Jeff Koons' favor. 73 The
71 The Castle Rock case involved a trivia book based on the television show
Seinfeld. The defendant creators of the trivia book tried to argue that the book
was transformative and critically commented upon the original work. The court
found that the first factor, the purpose and character of use, weighed against the
defendants because creating the trivia book only required minimal creativity and
had little or no transformative purpose. The point of the book was to provide
Seinfeld fans with more access to Seinfeld content, not to comment upon the
"nothingness" of the show, which the defendants attempted to assert as a pur-
pose. Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998).72 1d. at 143.
73 In Blanch v. Koons, Jeff Koons based a painting on a photograph from a
commercial magazine. He had a series of paintings that superimposed advertis-
ing images against pastoral backgrounds. Koons asserted that his purpose for
using the photograph was different than Blanch's purpose for creating it. Koons
wanted the viewer to think about his or her personal experiences with objects,
2015] 443
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court cited Castle Rock, finding that where the secondary work
used copyrightable expression as raw material to create new in-
formation, aesthetics, insights, and understandings it is the type of
activity allowed by the fair use doctrine.74 Under this standard,
Koons merely needed to have some new meaning, message, or
aesthetic for the first fair use factor to weigh in his favor.75 Simply
articulating the work's purpose of social commentary was suffi-
cient against infringement in the eyes of the court.7 6
However, because Blanch is a circuit court decision, all
courts need not follow it. When a secondary artist is able to claim
any original purpose, however minimal, is embodied in a work that
copies protection for the original work ceases to exist. There must
be some practical boundary to fair use, but the Second Circuit has
yet to articulate one. Instead, Blanch's standard simply allows ap-
propriation artists to ignore copyright protections and hide under
the broad shield of "transformation."
V. SUMMARIES OF CARIOU AND KENITZ
Cariou v. Prince is the latest in a series of Second Circuit
decisions regarding the fair use defense for appropriation art. In
Cariou, the Second Circuit moved further away from the tradition-
al statutory test for fair use, relying heavily upon the concept of
transformative use to decide that an appropriation artist's use of
original works was fair. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation is a recent Sev-
products, and images. The original purpose of the photograph was advertising.
The court found that the drastic difference between the original and secondary
purposes made Koons' secondary work transformative. Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
74 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252 (quoting Castle Rock Entm 't, 150 F.3d at 142).
75 id.
76 "Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch's image as fodder
for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His
stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch's 'Silk Sandals,' but to employ
it 'in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and under-
standings.' When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as "raw material," in the
furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is trans-
formative." Id. at 253.
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enth Circuit opinion that directly criticizes the Second Circuit's
approach in Cariou and provides the court's reasoning for its con-
tinued reliance on the fair use factors laid out in § 107.
A. Cariou Facts
Professional photographer Patrick Cariou spent six years
living among the Rastafarians in Jamaica, taking photographs that
he published in a book, Yes, Rasta.7 7 Cariou is the sole copyright
holder in the images in the book. 78 Richard Prince, a famous ap-
propriation artist, purchased a copy of Yes, Rasta and used the im-
ages in his own works. Prince admits to using at least 41 photos
from Cariou's book.79
Prior to Prince's unlicensed use, the photos from Yes, Rasta
had only been sold to individuals Cariou knew and had never been
licensed for use other than in the Yes, Rasta book.80 Cariou was in
negotiation with a gallery in New York to show and sell the prints,
but the gallery cancelled the show after Prince showed his work.81
The gallery canceled because the owner did not wish to be seen as
capitalizing on the fame of Prince's paintings and did not want to
show work that had been "done already."
82
77 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).7 8 jd.
79 Prince used images from Yes, Rasta to create a collection called Canal Zone.
The collection including a collage consisting of 35 photographs from Yes, Rasta
attached to a wooden board. It also included 28 paintings that incorporated im-
ages from Yes, Rasta. Some of Prince's paintings consisted almost entirely of
images from Yes, Rasta that were collaged, enlarged, cropped, tinted, or painted
over. Other paintings used photos from Yes, Rasta had more substantial original
painting and combined photos from Yes, Rasta with other appropriated photos
as part of a collage. Id. at 343-44.
80 Id. at 344.
81 Id.
82 Gagosian Gallery sold eight of Prince's Canal Zone paintings for a total of
$10,480,000. Prince received 60 percent of the purchase price, and Gagosian
received the other 40 percent. Cariou received nothing. A number of other Ca-
nal Zone paintings were traded for art with a value between $6 million and $8
million. The gallery also made $6,784 in exhibition catalog sales. Id. at 344,
350-51.
4452015]
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1. District Court Holding
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that Prince was not entitled to a fair use defense. 83 After de-
termining that Cariou's photos were worthy of copyright protec-
tion, the court turned to a fair use analysis and found that all four
factors of the fair use test weighed against a finding of fair use.
84
It granted an injunction against Prince's use of the photos and re-
quired that the defendants deliver all of the infringing works to
Cariou for impound or destruction.
85
The court found that the determination of the first factor,
purpose and character of use, is composed of two factors: trans-
formativeness and commerciality. 86 It found that Prince's works
were only transformative to the extent that they commented upon
Cariou's original works and that to the extent Prince's works only
recast, transformed, or adapted the photos absent comment, they
were infringing.8 7 It also determined that, under the second prong,
Prince's use of the photos was substantially commercial, which
83 The court found Prince directly liable and the gallery and gallery owner vicar-
iously liable as contributory infringers. Id. at 342.
84 In the court's aggregate analysis, it found that none of the four factors
weighed in favor of Prince. It found that "'the monopoly created by copyright'
does not unduly 'impede referential analysis [or] the development of new ideas
out of old' when copyright law is enforced under circumstances like those pre-
sented here." Id. at 353 (citing Leval at 1109).8 1 Id. at 355.
86 Id. at 347, 350.
87 Id. at 348. It found that the determination of "transformativeness" should be
guided by the examples given in § 107, which include criticism, comment, and
news reporting. Id. The court pointed to Castle Rock, noting that the fact that a
work "recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s] an original work into a new mode of
presentation," making it a derivative work, does not make the work "transforma-
tive" in the sense that the first fair use factor requires. Id. (citing Castle Rock,
150 F.3d at 143). The court refused to accept the argument that appropriation
art uses original works as "raw materials" and found that [i]f an infringement of
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use ... there would be no prac-
ticable boundary to the fair use defense." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
at 310).
446
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weighs against a finding of fair use. 88 This related to the court's
determination that the fourth factor, the effect on the potential
market for the copyrighted work, weighed against Prince because
his secondary works unfairly damaged the original market for Car-
iou's works, ruining his plans for exhibition, and would destroy
the potential licensing market for derivative use. 89 The second and
third factor were also found to favor Cariou.
90
a. Second Circuit Reversal
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment
with regard to twenty-five of Prince's artworks, vacated the in-
junction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding
the five remaining artworks that were potentially infringing. 91 Un-
like the district court, the Second Circuit found every factor
weighed in favor of Prince.92  Under the first factor, the court
found that Prince's work was transformative and that the commer-
ciality of the use was relatively unimportant because "[t]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a find-
ing of fair use." 93 The court found that twenty-five of Prince's
works were transformative as a matter of law 94 and remanded five
to the district court to determine whether they were sufficiently
88 Id. at 351.89 Id. at 353.
90 Id. at 352.
91 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2nd Cir. 2013).92 See generally, Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694.
93 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
94 The court said its focus was on Prince's works, not Prince's message. Id. at
707. It found that the twenty-five works it classified as transformative had a
"different character" giving Cariou's photographs a new expression and using a
new aesthetic for distinct creative and communicative results. Id. at 708. The
court went on to say that its conclusion should not be taken to suggest that cos-
metic changes alone would necessarily constitute a transformation for the pur-
poses of fair use, but it did not greatly elaborate. Id.
2015] 447
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transformative. 95  The court gave little weight to the remaining
three factors because of the transformative nature of the work.96
B. Kienitz Case Summary
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, photographer Michael
Kienitz sued Sconnie Nation for making t-shirts and tank tops that
used a photo of Madison, Wisconsin mayor Paul Soglin that
Kienitz took at the mayor's inauguration. 97 Sconnie Nation admit-
ted to downloading the photo from the city's website for use on its
shirts. 98  The photo was posterized, the background behind the
mayor was removed, and Soglin's face was colored lime green and
surrounded by multi-color lettering on the shirts.99 A magistrate
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that
Sconnie Nation was entitled to a fair use defense.100. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the holding based on its application of the four
factor fair use test.
10 1
95 1d. at 712.
96 The court found that the second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, was
"of limited usefulness" because the creative copyrighted work was used trans-
formatively. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. The court found that the third factor,
amount and substantiality of the portion used, weighed in favor of Prince be-
cause it did not believe the amount taken was greater than necessary, "the law
does not require that the secondary artist take no more than is necessary," and
the secondary use must be allowed to take enough to "fulfill its transformative
purpose." Id. The court found that the fourth factor, effect upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work, also weighed in favor of Prince. It said the
factor did not look to whether the secondary use "suppresses or even destroys
the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the sec-
ondary use usurps the market of the original work." Id. at 708 (emphasis origi-
nal) (quoting Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258). It found that Prince's work had not
usurped the market from the original. Id.
97 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
98 Id. at 757.
99 Id.
'
00 Id. at 758.
101 The Seventh Circuit found that only the third and fourth statutory factors had
any bite in this litigation because the character of the secondary work was polit-
ical commentary and the nature of the copyrighted work was irrelevant because
Kienitz failed to argue that there was any harm to the value of his copyright.
448
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VI. COMPETING USES TO FAIR USE
The fair use analysis of the Second Circuit in Cariou and
the Seventh Circuit in Sconnie Nation are at odds. The Second
Circuit weighs transformative use so heavily that it effectively
dismisses all of the other factors. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
refuses to look directly to transformative use as a factor at all, in-
stead sticking to the traditional statutory scheme.' While both
cases find fair use, the two courts take nearly opposite approaches
to the application of the fair use doctrine and the reasoning of the
two courts have vastly different implications for future cases. 103
A. What Constitutes Transformative Use?
In Cariou, the Second Circuit found that "[t]he law impos-
es no requirement that a work comment on the original or its au-
thor in order to be considered transformative, and a secondary
work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other
than those .. .identified in the statute."' 4  The court cites to
Campbell and Harper for support, but it is not clear that either of
those cases supports the Second Circuit's proposition. Both Cam-
pell and Harper support that a use may be fair even when it serves
some purpose other than those enumerated in § 107, but Campbell
treats commentary on the original work is the key to winning the
first factor of the fair use test.'0 5
A new work must generally alter the original with "new
expression, meaning, or message."' 6  Prince testified that he
"do[es]n't really have a message" and that he was not "trying to
The court determined that the third factor weighed in favor of the defendants
because only a small portion of the original work remained clearly visible; the
rest was dramatically altered. It also decided that the fourth factor weighed in
favor of the defendants because the secondary work, satirical t-shirts, did not
serve as a substitute for the original photograph. Id. at 758-60.
102 See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; see also Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 756.
103 Id.
104 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.
015 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
10 6 Id. at 579.
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create anything with a new meaning or message."' 0 7 Yet, the Car-
iou court found that all but five of Prince's works were transforma-
tive because they "manifest an entirely different aesthetic."10 8 If
the artist does not assert any new meaning or message, the court
must rely on the new expression in the work. 10 9 Judging whether
art has new expression is a dangerous task for judges because it is
a subjective, aesthetic valuation that judges are not trained to
make. Yet, the court did not hesitate to find that Prince's justifica-
tions did not matter and focused instead on the question of how the
secondary works appeared to reasonable observers." 
0
The court in Cariou looks to Campbell for support in this
assertion but misses the mark because Campbell's reasonable ob-
server requirement was related to the amount and substantiality of
the copyrighted work taken."' Campbell held that a parodist must
be able to take enough from the original work for the reasonable
observer to perceive what the secondary work is commenting on,
not that a reasonable observer must find that a work is trans-
formed.11 2 The leeway granted to the secondary artist in Campbell
was only granted because of the unique nature of parodies. Under
Campbell, the Court allows secondary artists to borrow enough
from an original work for audiences to understand the commentary
of the parody and to identify what the secondary work is parodiz-
ing.11 3 The Court does not explicitly state whether its permission
to borrow is limited to parodies, but it certainly does not extend to
circumstances like those in Cariou where there is no comment up-
on the original work at all."
14
107 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (quoting Cariou, 748 F.Supp.2d at 349).
'
08 Id. at 706.
109 Id. at 705.
..1 Id. at 707.
111 Campbell found that the amount and substantiality a parodist may borrow
depends on how much is necessary for a reasonable observer to recognize the
original work that is being parodied. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
112 "The threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is
whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived." Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 582.
113 Id. at 588.
Id. at 582.
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B. Cariou 's Transformative Use Analysis
Once a transformative use is found, there is still the ques-
tion of how heavily this element must be weighed in the overall
analysis for fair use. In Cariou the Second Circuit rested its find-
ing of fair use based almost entirely upon this factor." 5 Once the
court determined that the work was transformative, it held that all
four statutory factors weighed in favor of the defendant. "16
Though transformative use is just one of the elements to be
considered under the purpose and character factor of the fair use
test, the court found that the transformative nature of Prince's
work outweighed his commercial purpose and his bad faith in cop-
ying. 117 The court used similar reasoning in its analysis of the oth-
er three factors. When looking to the effect on potential market for
the copyrighted work, the court followed Castle Rock, finding that
"[t]he more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood
that the secondary use substitutes for the original [even though] the
fair use, being transformative, might well harm, or even destroy,
the market for the original."" 8 The court found that the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, was of "limited useful-
ness" where the copyrighted work is used for a transformative
purpose. 119
Lastly, under the third factor, amount and substantiality
taken, the court found that while the use of entire work does not
favor fair use, the law does not require a secondary artist take no
more of a copyrighted work than is "necessary" to complete their
new work.1 20 Because a secondary use must be permitted to bor-
row enough of an original work to fulfill its transformative pur-
pose, and because Prince's use was transformative, the court held
115 See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694.
116 Id. at 708-10.
117 "Although there is no question that Prince's artworks are commercial, we do
not place much significance on that fact due to the transformative nature of the
work." Id. at 708.
118 Id. at 709 (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145).
119 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 694.
120 Id.
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that the third factor weighed heavily in Prince's favor. 12 1 When
the court looked to the factors as a whole, all weighed in favor of
Prince, entitling him to a fair use defense.
122
C. Kienitz 's Transformative Use Analysis
In the Kienitz opinion, Judge Easterbrook was highly critical of the
Second Circuit's approach to fair use. 123  The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that "transformative use" is not one of the statutory
factors of § 107. Instead, it noted that it was a suggested sub-
factor the Supreme Court mentioned in Campbell.124 The Seventh
Circuit was skeptical of Cariou's approach because it effectively
replaces the factors of § 107. By focusing exclusively on whether
a work is transformative rather than applying the factors and the
Second Circuit's approach could potentially override 17 U.S.C. §
106(2).,,125 The Seventh Circuit instead chose to stick to the statu-
tory scheme, and focus on the fourth factor, potential market
harm. 1
26
This is not to say that the transformative nature of a work
does not come into play in the Seventh Circuit.127 Though the
court did not explicitly say so, it considered transformativeness in
its analysis of both the first and third factors. 12 8 Under the thirdfactor, the amount and substantiality taken from the original work
was minimal and these extensive changes created a transfor-
mation. 129 The court noted that the defendants removed so much
of the original work that the creative elements of original work's
121 Id.
122 Id.at 712.
121 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
124 iN.
125 Id. "The Second Circuit has run with the suggestion [from Campbell] and
concluded that 'transformative use' is enough to bring a modified copy within
the scope of § 107."
126 10.
127 See generally Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756; See also Brownmark Films. LLC v.
Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2012).
128 See generally Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756.
129 id.
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author were nearly extinguished, leaving only the outline of the
mayor's face and a hint of his smile, which cannot be copyrighted
because it does not contain sufficient originality.13
0
The secondary artists at Sconnie Nation also made signifi-
cant changes to the original expression of the photograph by pos-
terizing it, removing the background, changing the colors, and sur-
rounding the photo with multi-colored writing. 13 1 Additionally,
under the first factor, purpose and character of the work, the court
discussed the different, or transformative, purpose of the second-
ary work - political commentary. 132 The court found the first fac-
tor to be of little use because the statutorily favored purpose of
commentary and the commerciality of the defendants' products
kept the factor from weighing strongly in favor of either party. 1
33
D. Potential Market Harm
1. Cariou's Approach
The Second Circuit found that Prince's use did not cause
significant harm to the potential market for Cariou's work for three
reasons: (1) there were significant differences between the works;
(2) the focus should be on primary, rather than derivative, markets;
and (3) Cariou had not aggressively marketed his works and was
unlikely to develop a market that overlapped with Prince's. 134 The
first finding is problematic because the differences between the
works are subjective. This relates to the issue of Cariou and
Prince's works appealing to different markets. The court notes
that Prince's sales attracted high-profile buyers, whereas Cariou
made a modest $8,000 profit from his book. 135
130 id.
131 See generally, Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756.
132 id.
133 Kienitz. at 759. "The other statutory factors don't do much in this case. Con-
sider (1), for example. Defendants sold their products in the hope of profit, and
made a small one, but they chose the design as a form of political commentary."
134 See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
135 Id. at 699.
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However, the fact that Prince has already captured a market
should not deprive Cariou of a chance to try to enter that market.
Prince might have been able to sell the secondary works to high-
end buyers because of his reputation, but those buyers also may
have made their purchases because they saw something unique
about the art itself, namely Cariou's photos. Cariou lost the oppor-
tunity to bring his works to those buyers because Prince did so first
by creating unauthorized derivatives.
2. Kienitz's Approach
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit determined that the fourth
factor, potential market harm, weighed in favor of the secondary
artists because t-shirts and tank tops do not substitute for original
photographs. 36 The court also noted that Kienitz did not argue
that he planned to license his work for apparel or that the second-
ary artists' products had reduced the demand for the original
work. 13 7 The court implies that Kienitz could have had a good
case, had he chosen to present it, because the defendants did not
need to use his copyrighted work to achieve their goal and its use
might injure Kienitz long-term commercial success by damaging
his reputation. 38 Kienitz worked with high-end clients who would
not appreciate professional photos they paid for eventually being
used in products that mock them. The defendants' satirical use of
Kienitz's photo could have a potentially negative impact on
Kienitz's future business because important clients like political
figures likely do not appreciated having photos they paid for used
to make a mockery of them down the line. 139 The defendants also
had no excuse for using the Kienitz's photo because they could
have taken their own snapshot of the mayor to use in their t-shirt
design.' 40 Kienitz's failure to raise the argument about long-term
reputational harm. led to the court finding that the defendants need
'
36 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759.
137 id.
138 id.
139 Id.
140 ld-
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not have used Kienitz's photo insufficient to offset that hardly any
of the original work remained in the finished secondary product. 141
E. Focusing on Market Substitution
It is important to note the contrast of the approaches of the
Second and Seventh Circuits on this issue. The fourth factor, po-
tential market harm, weighed against the copyright holder in
Kienitz, but this was in large part because the copyright holder
failed to present the right arguments. 142 Had Kienitz argued that
he planned to license his photographs for apparel and that the sec-
ondary artists' use damaged his reputation and, as a consequence,
the demand for his photographs, the Seventh Circuit likely would
have weighed the fourth factor in his favor. 143 The court even
made some of the argument for him in dicta. In Cariou, the Se-
cond Circuit's ruling against the copyright holder was not based on
his failure to make arguments. Instead, it was based on the sec-
ondary artist's "transformative use."
144
In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Supreme Court found that commercial uses were pre-
sumptively unfair. 145 The Court has since backed away from this
reasoning, but that does not mean that the Court intended to back
away from the full use of the factor. 146 In Harper, the Supreme
Court found that the fourth factor was the most important in the
fair use inquiry. 147 In Campbell, the Court affirmatively stated
141 Kienitz, at 759.
142 id.
143 Id.
144 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.145 In Sony, the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of videotape players that al-
lowed customers to record live television did not constitute copyright infringe-
ment. The Court found that the devices were capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses, in particular recording shows whose copyright holders did not mind at-
home recording and time shifting, which merely allowed viewers to watch live
television broadcasts at a later time. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studi-
os, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
146 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
147 Harper, 471 U.S. at 566.
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there was no presumption of infringement when a use was com-
mercial and that transformative works made market substitution
less certain.
148
However, the Campbell court went on to say that the dis-
tinction between remediable and unremediable displacement was
whether the market that the secondary work uses is one that the
creator of the original work would typically develop or license
others to develop. 149 The Second Circuit looks to this distinction
in its Cariou reasoning but is unclear on the importance it plays.
1 50
The court decided that Prince's market was too different from Car-
iou's for the use to constitute usurpation, but that is not obvious to
the lay observer. 15 1 As Campbell points out, fair use is an affirma-
tive defense. 152 The burden is on the potential infringer to show
that they did not cause market harm to the original author.' 53 Yet,
the Second Circuit decided that Prince did not harm Cariou's mar-
ket without requiring Prince to carry that burden of proof.
VII. THE FAIR USE PROBLEM CREATED BY CARIOU
While the Second Circuit standard for fair use addresses
some of Congress' concerns regarding copyright law, it fails to
provide a clear distinction between fair borrowing and infringe-
ment in cases of art appropriation. The standard lacks predictabil-
148 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
149 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. In Campbell, the Court provides the example of
criticism. The Court states that the market for potential derivatives only in-
cludes the types of works that original creators would generally develop or li-
cense others to develop. There is no derivative market for criticism because it is
highly unlikely that authors would license others to make negative reviews. Au-
thors do not want criticism; they want praise. So, pure criticism is not consid-
ered a derivative work. However, more complex secondary works may venture
beyond criticism and into other protectable derivative markets. In that case,
courts must look beyond the criticism to the other elements of the work to de-
termine its fairness.
"0 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
151 Id.
152 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
153 id.
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ity and creates confusion among copyright holders and potential
infringers alike because the concept of "transformativeness" is too
nebulous to predict the outcome of litigation.
The Seventh Circuit provides a more workable standard. It
applies the statutory factors required by § 107, weighing all four to
reach a reasonably predictable outcome. The Second Circuit, in
contrast, really just looks at whether the secondary work is "trans-
formative." Transformative use is not required by the Copyright
Statute and has never been expressly mandated as a new factor by
the Supreme Court. It is just one element of one of the four statu-
torily required factors. Determining what is transformative is
highly subjective. A court must use other factors to counterbal-
ance transformativeness in order to create outcomes that rely on
more than judges' subjective opinions about which works are de-
rivative and which works are "transformed." Failing to apply the
additional statutorily mandated factors ignores the importance of
the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality
taken, and the potential commercial harm caused by the unauthor-
ized use, all of which Congress found important enough to include
in the Copyright Statute. The four-factor standard required by §
107 is not easy for courts to apply in cases with complex facts, but
brushing that test aside for a "transformative use" test is not the
right answer.
A. Subjective Determinations Are Properly Made by the Trial
Court
It is impossible to have any type of transformative use legal
standard without applying some level of subjective judgment in
deciding whether the art has been "transformed enough" to merit a
fair use defense. However, as a subjective and factual judgment,
this is best left to the trial courts, which are meant to address ques-
tions of fact. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
52(a), trials courts are to find facts specially and state conclusions
of law separately. 154 So, appellate courts are not a proper forum
154 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(1)
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for overriding the aesthetic judgments of the lower courts unless
there is an egregious misapplication of the law.
The Second Circuit granted Prince a fair use defense for
twenty-five of Prince's artworks because the works had "an entire-
ly different aesthetic" from Cariou's photographs but sent five
artworks back to the district court on remand to determine whether
or not the minimal changes made to Cariou's photographs were
sufficient to constitute fair use.1 55 The Second Circuit said these
five works, while different from Cariou's work, remained similar
in "key aesthetic ways" and determined that the district court was
the appropriate forum for determining whether the minimal altera-
tions to the works created enough of a transformation to render the
works a fair use.
156
Why then did the Second Circuit think the appellate court
is the appropriate place to decide whether the other twenty-five
works are transformative? Even if the Second Circuit disagreed
with the lower court's requirement that the secondary works in
some way comment on the original, it should have remanded all of
Prince's works for a determination of fair use in light of the Se-
cond Circuit's finding that no commentary requirement was im-
posed by the law.
The majority's distinction between the works it deemed
transformative and those it remanded was understandable. Subjec-
tively, five of Prince's works remained aesthetically similar to
Cariou's original photographs while the other twenty-five involved
greater alterations. 157 Making a final determination at the appel-
155 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 706.
156 1d. at 710-11.
157 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 710-11. "As indicated above, there are five artworks
that, upon our review, present closer questions. Specifically, Graduation, Medi-
tation, Canal Zone (2008), Canal Zone (2007), and Charlie Company do not
sufficiently differ from the photographs of Cariou's that they incorporate for us
confidently to make a determination about their transformative nature as a mat-
ter of law. Although the minimal alterations that Prince made in those instances
moved the work in a different direction from Cariou's classical portraiture and
landscape photos, we cannot say with certainty at this point whether those art-
works present a 'new expression, meaning, or message."' (Quoting Campbell,
510 U.S. at 579).
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late level for the twenty-five photos the Second Circuit found
transformative promoted judicial efficiency by preventing the need
for further proceedings. It also prevented the need for expert tes-
timony, which is expensive and still leads to a subjective determi-
nation of which pieces of art are aesthetically different enough to
be transformed. On some level, all fair use determinations are sub-
jective because judges weigh the statutory factors based on their
own values and observations about the works at hand. However,
the fact that courts will likely never completely eliminate subjec-
tivity from fair use determinations does not mean that they should
stop trying to eliminate it where they can.
In his dissenting opinion Cariou, Justice Clifford Wallace
points out that the usual process for correcting an erroneous legal
standard used by a trial court is to remand the case. 58 Wallace
suggests that a remand was appropriate in Cariou because factual
determinations needed to be reevaluated and new evidence or ex-
pert opinions may have been necessary to determine whether any
of Prince's works were transformative. 59 Wallace did not see how
the appellate court's majority could "confidently" draw a distinc-
tion between the twenty-five works it identified as fair uses and the
five works it remanded to the trial court.' He failed to see the
line because it does not, from an objective legal standpoint, exist.
If a court is to make an aesthetic evaluation that is best done
through the use of experts, not by using judges' personal taste. Af-
ter all, "'it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.""161
158 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 (Wallace, dissent).
159 Id. at 712-13.
16 0 1d. at 713.
161 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 714 (Wallace, dissent) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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B. The Difficulty of Predicting Whether a Work Is
"Transformative "
Even if the appellate court were the appropriate place to
determine whether a work is transformative, there is no apparent
line between what the Second Circuit finds transformative and
non-transformative. The court notes that its conclusion "should
not be taken to suggest.., that any cosmetic changes to the photo-
graphs would necessarily constitute a fair use," and that "[a] sec-
ondary work may modify the original without being transforma-
tive." Yet, the court gives little explanation for how twenty-five
of Prince's works "add[ed] something new" and "presented images
with a fundamentally different aesthetic" while five did not.'
63
The court recognizes that works that "merely present the same ma-
terial but in a new form" the way that book synopses of televisions
shows do are not transformative 164 but does not explain how to dis-
tinguish between what is classified as an unauthorized derivative
and what constitutes a transformative work that qualifies for fair
use.
The Seventh Circuit cautioned against the reasoning in
Cariou precisely because of this lack of clarity. 165 According to
the court in Kienitz, a transformative work is a derivative work
which the original author has the exclusive right to create. The
Second Circuit fails to explain how "transformative uses" can be a
"fair uses" when they extinguish the original author's exclusive
rights under § 106(2). 166 By sticking to the traditional statutory
test, the Seventh Circuit avoids the ambiguity of "transformative
use," instead weighing the factors that Congress found im-
portant.
1 67
162 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
163 Id. (citing Leibowitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114
(1998)).
64Id. at 709 (citing Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143).
165 Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 758.
166 id.
167 id.
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C. Commerciality Matters When Determining Fair Use
The Second Circuit's finding that the focus should be on
primary rather than potential derivative markets in regard to com-
merciality is directly at odds with the Supreme Court.' 68 The Se-
cond Circuit found that nothing in the record suggested that Cariou
planned to develop or license secondary uses of his works in the
same market as Prince's artworks. 169 While it is unlikely that Car-
iou, a traditional photographer, would create works like those of
Prince, it is completely conceivable that he would like to obtain li-
censing fees from artists in Prince's market who wished to create
derivatives. Regardless, any artist using Cariou's works without
paying diminishes the value of his copyright. Why should other
artists license Cariou's works when appropriation artists like
Prince, who do not specifically intend to comment on Cariou's
works, use them for free?
The Second Circuit also minimizes the importance of a gal-
lery show Cariou booked being cancelled as a result of Prince's
works, causing harm to Cariou's primary market for the original
works. The Second Circuit chalked up the cancellation to a mis-
understanding, but the gallery owner directly stated that she can-
celled because she did not wish to show work that had been "done
already. ,170 As the original artist, Cariou should have to the right
to show his work when he sees fit. There was a considerable
length of time between the publication of Cariou's book and his
intended gallery exhibition, but such an exhibition is foreseeable
for a professional photographer. The law does not place a time
limit on how long an artist may wait to show his work before an-
other artist is authorized to swoop in and claim it as his own, and
relatively unknown artists may have to wait longer to find good
opportunities to exhibit. In this respect, the Second Circuit's rea-
soning punished Cariou for his relative anonymity. It essentially
gave better known artists like Prince the right to take little known
168 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Roe, 471 U.S. at 568.
169 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
'
70 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704.
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art, make derivatives of it, then sell it in markets that emerging art-
ists have yet to reach, claiming that the emerging artists cannot be
harmed by sales that would have been out of their reach.17 1 If art-
ists like Prince, who are a position to pay for licenses, are not re-
quired to do so, artists like Cariou have little chance of success for
two reasons: first, the lesser known artist will not receive any li-
censing revenue and, secondly, if the lesser known artist finally
breaks into a higher priced market, the appropriation artists already
in that market may have already saturated it with the lesser known
artist's works.
As noted above, the Cariou majority noted derivative
works that merely present the original material in a new format do
not qualify as transformative, using the example of book synopses
of television shows. 172 David Nimmer, a legal authority in the
copyright field, points out that this rule would likely apply to mo-
tion pictures based on novels and that it is difficult to know what
metric the court applied to determine that art appropriation was a
transformative use while the dramatization of a novel was not.'73
After all, a film must incorporate "'composition, presentation,
scale, color palette, and media [that] are fundamentally different
and new compared to the' book ... but those consideration, in the
171 "Prince's work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou's.
Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more dollars.
The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the
opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous
such as the musicians Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and
Jeff Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model Gisele Bund-
chen, Vanity Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors
Jonathan Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, Angelina
Jolie, and Brad Pitt. Prince sold eight artworks for a total of $10,480,000, and
exchanged seven others for works by painter Larry Rivers and by sculptor Rich-
ard Serra. Cariou on the other hand has not actively marketed his work or sold
work for significant sums, and nothing in the record suggests that anyone will
not now purchase Cariou's work, or derivative non-transformative works
(whether Cariou's own or licensed by him) as a result of the market space that
Prince's work has taken up." 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 (2014), (quot-
ing Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709).
172 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05
173 id.
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past, have never led to the blanket conclusion that it is fair use to
produce an unauthorized film" based on a literary composition. 4
It seems that here the Cariou court carved out a special exception
for appropriation art without explaining why.
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit considered potential com-
mercial harm to both direct and derivative markets. 175 It deter-
mined that the secondary work, a printed t-shirt parodying the
mayor, did not create a substitute for the original photograph. 176 It
pointed out that Kienitz failed to argue that the defendant's prod-
ucts reduced the demand for the original work or any contemplated
use. 177 Kienitz also failed to argue that he had any plan to license
the work for apparel.178 Thus, Kienitz may have ultimately lost the
case because he failed to allege the appropriate types of injury.
What is important is that that Seventh Circuit went out of its way
to point out those potential injuries, creating a useable roadmap for
future litigants. Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, potential
market harm to the copyright holder likely weighs strongly in his
or her favor. 179 This stands in stark contrast to the Second Cir-
cuit's approach in Cariou, which considered Prince's use fair even
though the copyright holder alleged legitimate market damage. 180
D. Conflicts with the Copyright Statute
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit is skeptical about using
"transformativeness" as the core of its fair use analysis because it
is not one of the factors from § 107 and the Second Circuit's use of
it effectively replaces those factors with a single, unclear ele-
ment.' 8' There is also a concern that the Second Circuit's use of
174 Id.
'71 Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 759.
17 6 id.
177 id.
1781id
179 id.
180 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 708
181 Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 758.
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transformativeness eviscerates the author's exclusive right to de-
rivative works under § 106. 82
Cariou's standard is not without some merit, depending
upon what the court thinks the goals of copyright are. The Cariou
court's stance seems to be that allowing as many new works as
possible to be created, regardless of any copyright protection that
exists for the underlying work, is the best way to advance Con-
gress' goal of promoting science and useful arts.
In contrast, allowing rampant copying with no clear pur-
pose and no repercussions for failing to obtain a license may very
well undercut the goals of copyright by discouraging original art-
ists from creating new works because of the decreased value of
their copyrights. Licensing gives artists the ability to access one
another's works for a fair price. Cariou incentivizes appropriation
artists to skip paying for a license because there is no penalty for
taking from an original work as long as the court deems the sec-
ondary work "transformative." Even if Congress' goals are the
same as the Cariou courts, the Second Circuit's current application
of the transformative use standard causes a problem because it is at
odds with the language of the statute, making the fair use defense
highly unpredictable for all parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit has not explained how transformative-
ness can be used as a factor without nullifying the Copyright stat-
ute, nullifying authors' rights, and destroying the licensing market
for original works. It fails to create any useable test to determine
what is transformative enough to fall under fair use and what is in-
fringing, which creates uncertainty for artists and attorneys. A cer-
tain amount of subjectivity is unavoidable when determining fair
use, but transformativeness is the least measurable element courts
use. It is highly unpredictable and, therefore, inappropriate to use
as the sole factor for determining fair use. Where transformative-
ness is used as a factor, determinations of which works are trans-
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formative are properly left to the trial court and should receive
deference from courts of appeals absent abuse of discretion. Due
to these problems, the Seventh Circuit standard is the better stand-
ard to follow until either Congress or the Supreme Court endorses
change.
What modem copyright needs is some clarity. To solve the
problems presented by these cases, the Supreme Court needs to
overturn a case following the Cariou line of reasoning and adopt a
clearer standard for the application of the fair use doctrine. The
Supreme Court should clarify how to apply the factors and wheth-
er any of the factors receive more weight. The Court needs to de-
cide how to determine transformative use and the appropriate fo-
rum for doing so. The Court, or Congress, should also clarify the
goals of copyright when it comes to situations like appropriation
art. The standard needs to remain flexible, but more guidance is
needed for the Circuits to rule in a manner that is predictable both
for copyright holders and persons interested in using copyrighted
works. Whether that clarification should be in favor of the original
copyright holders or appropriation artists making new works is a
matter for Congress to decide, but, without a mandate from that
level, the Second Circuit's reasoning cannot be supported.
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